Like Lincoln and Kennedy, a shocking number of parallels exist between the Knicks and Grizzlies. The real stunner is where they differ, and how — and what it suggests about the future

Earlier this week I recapped the most recent Knicks/Grizzlies game. That got me thinking about the bigger picture for two franchises who mirror each other’s recent timelines, milestones and draft positions, despite a strong divergence in philosophy and execution. This article delves into the intricacies of their journeys and what it reveals about their strategic foresight – or lack thereof.

Then

While they didn’t begin at the exact same time, both the Knicks’ and Grizzlies’ recent rebuilds commenced after the brief tenure of a coach we all know and love, David Fizdale. Fizdale took over the Grizzlies in May 2016 and led them to a 43-39 record and a playoff appearance in his first season. That run was cute, extending the franchise-record streak to seven straight postseasons, and made for an all-time great meme, but after a 7-12 start that reached its nadir with the controversial benching of star center Marc Gasol, Fiz was fired. Under interim coach J.B. Bickerstaff, Memphis finished 22-60, tying their worst record since abandoning Vancouver.

Memphis had another down year in 2018-19, enough for top-to-bottom house-cleaning. General manager Chris Wallace was shifted to a role in the scouting department, replaced by Zach Kleiman while Jason Wexler was named president. A few weeks later, days before the 2019 draft, Memphis named Taylor Jenkins head coach. A new era was underway. 

Fizdale was named Knicks head coach in May 2018, then led them to a 17-65 record his first year, the worst in franchise history. We all know how the story went after that season, but in case you forgot: Zion Williamson. RJ Barrett. Kevin Durant. Julius Randle.

In 2019-20 the Knicks opened 4-18, enough for Fizdale to get the axe midseason. Two months later, the Knicks fired Steve Mills and handed the keys to Leon Rose and the the CAA mafia. A new era was underway. 

While the Grizzlies may have had a headstart on their post-Fizdale rebuild, both teams made their first new-look playoff appearance in a euphoric 2020-21. In New York, Randle underwent a Captain America-like transformation and shot the lights out of a fan-less Madison Square Garden. The Rose-led front office shrewdly added veterans Alec Burks and Nerlens Noel along with draft picks Obi Toppin and Immanuel Quickley. We can’t forget Barrett, who followed up his disastrous rookie season with arguably the best year of his entire career. Top that off with a midseason trade for Derrick Rose, who went on to receive votes for Sixth Man and MVP, and you’ve got the “WE HERE” Knicks we all know and love.

Rather than rebuild by bottoming out for another high draft pick, the way the league zigged, Leon Rose had the Knicks zag, choosing to compete right away, even with a roster light years away from true contention. The Knicks made an array of low-risk, high-reward moves and were rewarded. 

1,100 miles from Madison Square Garden, FedEx Forum welcomed Ja Morant, who took the leap to superstardom, averaging 19 points and seven assists a game while turning the Grizz around. After three straight losing seasons outside the playoffs, Memphis went 38-34, made the Play-In Tournament and advanced, falling to Utah in the first round. Unlike the Knicks, the Grizzlies' youth was enough to field a competitive roster without requiring veteran talent: besides Morant, Dillon Brooks, Jaren Jackson Jr., Brandon Clarke and rookie Desmond Bane all produced. A tantalizing young core looked primed to make noise for many years. 

While the Knicks and Grizzlies seemingly ran parallel after both exited the 2021 playoffs 4-1 in the first round, it was the upcoming offseason that set these franchises on a crash course. Looking to build on their newfound success and fill in the cracks of a roster thin on talent, the Knicks signed Evan Fournier and Kemba Waker while making four picks in the draft: Quentin Grimes, Miles McBride, Jericho Sims and the rights to Rokas Jokubaitis.

That same draft, the Grizzlies traded Jonas Valančiūnas and the 17th pick for Steven Adams, Eric Bledsoe’s expiring contract and the 10th pick – plenty of other nuts and bolts in that deal, but it boiled down to the Pelicans opening a ton of cap space and upgrading at center. The Grizzlies took Ziaire Williams; seven spots later, New Orleans chose Trey Murphy III. NBA Twitter called it a win for both sides. 

NARRATOR: It was not a win for both sides.

New York’s process that offseason was clear. Walker and Fournier replaced Elfrid Payton and Reggie Bullock in the starting lineup; Burks & Noel would hold down the bench as the new crop of rookies took time to develop in Westchester. The Memphis process was less clear. Williams, 19 and considered by many a project, would be expected to contribute in year one without any veteran additions competing for his spot. Besides Williams, the Grizzlies made no other moves of substance. 

2021-22 is perhaps the most consequential in this brief story of two franchises. The Knicks’ splashy summer fell flat on its face, the Kemba experiment a total dud. Fournier couldn’t guard a parked car. Tom Thibodeau trotted out Alec Burks as his starting point guard half the season. While Grimes, McBride and Sims showed encouraging flashes when the season was a lost cause, the Knicks missed the playoffs and the play-in, landing the 11th pick in the draft.

The Grizzlies built successfully upon their 2021 with an astounding 56-26 record, good for second in the West. Much of that can be attributed to Morant, who continued to elevate his game to heights few thought he’d reach so soon. Bane also made a name for himself, increasing his points per game from 14.8 to 22.0 while maintaining his trademark efficiency and staunch perimeter defense. The Grizzlies managed to steamroll through the regular season while giving 22 minutes a night to rookie Ziaire Williams, who struggled to make much of an impact. Must be nice to have a Ja. 

Following an über-successful regular season, the Grizzlies earned themselves a first-round match-up with Minnesota, a series they won in six, followed by defeat at the hands of eventual champions Golden State, a series that saw Memphis down only one entering the fourth quarter of Game 6. It didn’t take a genius to recognize Memphis had significantly outperformed expectations; how they’d attack the upcoming offseason spoke volumes about how their front office viewed their future. Perhaps trying to mimic the 2021 Knicks’ wholesale actions, the Grizzlies took home four rookies from the 2022 draft: Jake LaRavia (selected 19th), David Roddy (23rd), Kennedy Chandler (38th) and Vince Williams Jr. (47th). This is where the Grizzlies completely fumbled the winning infrastructure they’d built out in the two seasons before. 

Among an array of transactions on draft night, Memphis’ most notable sent De’Anthony Melton to Philadelphia for the 23rd pick, where they took Roddy. Melton, 23, emerged as a serious contributor for the Grizzlies the year prior and looked like the perfect off-ball guard to play alongside Morant for years. Memphis needed to clear cap space due to impending extensions for Morant, Clarke, Adams and Tyus Jones; they opted to turn Melton into a rookie contract to save money on the margins.

While Roddy, a three-year player at Colorado, excelled at the college level, it was clear he had significant strides to make as a shooter and defender before he could contribute in the NBA. At 6-foot-4, Roddy lacks guard skills and plays basketball like an NFL fullback, making his role difficult to project. In an ideal scenario, Roddy could be a Draymond Green-esuqe switchable connector whose competitive motor makes up for what he lacks in size. While Roddy provides fun hypotheticals and was a low-risk flyer with the 23rd pick, he was far from the player the Grizzlies needed at the time.

The night they traded Melton, the Grizzlies sent the 22nd and 29th picks to Minnesota for the 19th and a future 2nd. Memphis selected LaRavia, while Minnesota took Auburn’s Walker Kessler and traded the 29th pick. Like Roddy, LaRavia was a three-year college player, but his elite shooting and 6-foot-7 frame made his NBA role easier to forecast; he seemed primed for the rotation in year one. 

Shortly after draft night, Memphis acquired Chandler from San Antonio for a 2024 2nd-rounder. An undersized lead guard, Chandler shined against college defenses, but there were questions whether his scoring would translate in the pros. With Melton traded, the 19-year-old 5-foot-11 Chandler ended up the third guard on the depth chart.

The Grizzlies severely miscalculated what Melton was giving them. He had no problem defending an opponent’s best guard, taking that pressure off of Morant, as well as offering reliable three-point shooting to help space Memphis’ drive-centric offense. Expecting Roddy or Chandler to come in and replace Melton’s production immediately was poor planning. 

Williams Jr. was far from NBA-ready, appearing in just 15 games in 2022-23. After being kept in the doghouse to begin his career, Williams has impressed as a hard-nosed defender and shooter for this year’s Grizzlies. I don’t want to get too ahead of myself, but he may be the best player the Grizzlies took in this draft. 

Unlike the Knicks’ class of 2021, the Grizzlies’ 2022 class saw three of the four rookies tasked with the expectation of contributing in year one. Like Ziaire Williams the year prior, Roddy, LaRavia and Chandler had little competition for their minutes. The Grizzlies didn’t make a single splashy signing or trade in the following months and practically ran back their entire (surprisingly successful) 2021-22 roster, with Melton swapped out for a fresh crop of rookies.

The Knicks, however, did make a splashy free agent move in 2022, signing Jalen Brunson to a four-year, $104 million contract. In a calculated yet extreme risk, the Knicks intelligently freed cap space for Brunson by moving off of the Kemba, Noel and Burks contracts they’d handed out the prior summer. Knowing their rotation was crowded with young players clamoring for minutes, the Knicks punted on the 11th pick, turning it into multiple protected future 1st-rounders.

Also that offseason, the Knicks signed Isaiah Hartenstein away from the Clippers on a two-year, $16 million contract. Many Knick fans thought Sims was ready to take over the backup center spot with Noel out the door and questioned bringing in Hartenstein. Those fans would eventually be silenced, as Hartenstein emerged as a serious upgrade over both Noel and Sims while giving the Knicks a completely different offensive look than they had with Mitchell Robinson. 

Now

With each team three years into its respective new era, let’s take a moment to zoom out.

The Knicks had a long-term plan for every position, created constant competition for minutes and did not rely on rookies to contribute at a high level. Each rookie had at least one veteran they needed to outplay to earn a spot in the rotation. Conversely, the Grizzlies lacked roster foresight and relied upon rookies to contribute at a high level; most were (almost immediately) handed a spot in the rotation and able to play without veterans breathing down their necks. 

There are examples of New York’s competition-based development strategy in every year of the Leon Rose era: signing Austin Rivers after drafting Immanuel Quickley, Kemba after drafting McBride, Fournier after drafting Grimes, Noel and Hartenstein after drafting Sims. While these rookies all got brief moments of playing time when incumbents went down with injury, they were not truly relied upon until late in their second season (Grimes) or early in their third (McBride, Sims). This creates a cutthroat environment; players know they won’t be handed minutes until they prove themselves in practice or the G-League, and will be held accountable for mistakes made in their brief NBA minutes.

The Grizzlies did the opposite. Ziaire Williams, drafted as a project, played over 1,300 minutes his rookie year. Roddy played over 1,200. Even LaRavia and Chandler got a decent chunk of run their first years. According to PBP Stats, Memphis posted a -1.35 rating with Roddy on the floor and a -7.45 with LaRavia in 2022-23. Luckily for them, Ja, Bane, and Defensive Player of the Year Jaren Jackson were enough to offset a weak and inexperienced supporting cast – in the regular season, at least.

The Knicks also had a stellar 2022-23, as Brunson’s star leap paired with Randle’s rejuvenation to lead New York to a fifth-seed and the playoffs’ second round. We also witnessed the emergence of Grimes, named the starting shooting guard in December 2022 after being frozen in carbonite the first year and a half of his career. We can’t overlook the midseason trade for Josh Hart, which sent Cam Reddish and New York’s 2023 1st to Portland. This trade, another calculated risk, paid large dividends, as the Knicks established a new identity the minute Hart entered the building. 

With New York — even after their playoff defeat to Miami — on a sustainable climb, things came crashing down for Memphis after the regular season, their lack of depth and experience exposed by the Lakers in the playoffs, where all their rookies failed to contribute. This was also when Dillon Brooks decided to become one of the worst players in the NBA, whose scoring, defense and ego took a severe hit in the playoffs. Morant was involved in repeated incidents of flashing a firearm on Instagram Live, along with a handful of other criminal allegations ranging from a threatening incident at a FinishLine store to a fight with a 17-year-old. He was suspended the first 25 games of this season and dropped from an array of endorsement deals. 

Also worth noting: Kennedy Chandler was waived shortly after the playoffs. He signed with Brooklyn, briefly, but is yet to make an NBA appearance since being dropped by Memphis and looks primed for a career in the G-Leauge or overseas. Chandler is not an NBA player, and it only took one season for the Grizzlies to find out. 

What once seemed a strong young core, primed for long-term success, had become a pile of question marks that needed answering. 

First order of business was Dillon Brooks, dramatically let go by the Grizzlies in a now-infamous Shams tweet. For all of Brooks’ antics, he’s a talented player who had a strong regular season and was named to the All-Defense Second Team. It would’ve been beneficial for the Grizzlies to figure something out and keep Brooks around; the situation was untenable, and Memphis got nothing in return when he signed with Houston. The Grizzlies could’ve moved his expiring contract before last year’s trade deadline, but they likely didn’t forecast his playoff collapse and expected they’d want to re-sign him. 

Knowing Morant would miss at least the first quarter of the season, the Grizzlies needed to figure something out at point guard. Memphis inserted themselves into a complicated three-team trade with Boston and Washington that saw Jones head to the Wizards, Kristaps Porziņģis to the Celtics and Marcus Smart to Memphis as the temporary starting point guard. It seemed that Jones wanted to be named a full-time starter, and that wasn’t happening when Morant returned. The idea of Smart made sense, a battle-tested veteran who can still produce at a high level. Smart seemed the perfect vet to put next to Morant, for the sake of professional growth and as and someone who could hold down the fort during Morant’s suspension, so I’m not going to criticize this trade. 

With Jones, Chandler, and Morant all out the door, the Grizzlies still needed to fill their backup point guard spot. Jones, who held the spot the previous three seasons, was one of the best backups in the league, not easy to replace. Memphis opted to sign Derrick Rose, a move that felt like a cheesy TV storyline, with Rose finishing his career in the city where he played his college ball. Unfortunately for Memphis, Rose is cooked; anybody who watched his final days in New York knew this. Memphis planning to rely on him for anything more than emergency minutes was baffling. I thought Rose was ready to ride into the sunset and was shocked he got another deal, let alone one that saw him walking into guaranteed minutes.

Besides a few moves at the end of their bench, Smart and Rose were the only transactions of consequence for a Memphis team that seemed to lack direction for 2023-24. The Knicks, however, did make some big moves in the summer, trading former lottery pick Obi Toppin to Indiana for just two 2nd-rounders, biting the bullet on a failed draft pick and moving on. Toppin was replaced with Donte DiVincenzo, already outperforming the 4-year, $47 million deal the Knicks gave him. 

After swapping Toppin for DiVincenzo, rumors began to swirl about the Knicks shopping RJ Barrett for an upgrade on the wing. As much as Barrett endeared himself with Knick fans. the franchise’s highest draft pick since Patrick Ewing RJ was the only net-negative player in New York’s nine-man rotation a year ago; upgrading his spot seemed like the obvious next step for a team constantly looking for improvement. Zach LaVine, Paul George, Mikal Bridges, OG Anunoby and a handful of others were all tossed into a soup of rumors, but nothing came to a boil. 

The Knicks began 2023-24 running in place. RJ was still a negative in year five of his career and the front office was running out of patience. On December 30th, the Knicks made the most consequential transaction of the Leon Rose era, Barrett and Quickley to Toronto for Anunoby, Precious Achiuwa and Malachi Flynn. The upgrade on the wing from Barrett to Anunoby was so significant that losing Quickley, while painful, was worth it. The Knicks identified a poor contract on their books in Barrett’s and rid themselves of it, as they did with Burks, Kemba and Noel, and are likely to do with Fournier, in a few weeks or sometime next season. 

Unlike New York, Memphis hasn’t made a move of consequence since the then-new Grizz crashed the playoffs in 2021. They’re afraid to take a big swing and make the calculated risks necessary for substantial roster improvement. Besides swapping point guards, the Grizzlies sat on their hands in an offseason that required them to take the next step. They were anticipating internal growth. Besides Morant and Bane, I’m not sure where that was supposed to come from. 

Memphis was mentioned in rumors for Mikal Bridges, Kevin Durant and even Bradley Beal. Maybe their head is in the right spot, but rumors mean nothing until a deal is actually done. As mentioned before, the Grizzlies could’ve traded Brooks before the 2023 deadline, knowing they were unlikely to re-sign him in the summer. But they didn’t. They could’ve traded Ziaire Williams, young players and assets for an upgrade this summer. Or last summer. They didn’t.

The Grizzlies went 6-19 in their 25 games without Morant. Rose missed nearly half of them injured. Who could’ve predicted that? I certainly could’ve! Morant returned with a vengeance, with Memphis winning four straight upon his return to the lineup. Unfortunately, he soon suffered a season-ending labral tear and subluxation of his right shoulder.

Now what?

Now Memphis is left with just Smart, Rose and 5-foot-8 two-way contractee Jacob Gilyard in their point guard room. Memphis will likely bottom out this season and receive a top-five pick in the draft. Maybe they’ll finally take a big swing to put some elite talent next to Morant. Until then, Memphis is headed nowhere, and they’re headed there fast. 

New York, however, is primed to take even more swings in the future, as they’ve maintained a plurality of future draft picks and not sacrificed cap flexibility. Like Memphis with Brooks, New York is armed with Fournier’s expiring contract, one that includes a $19 million team option, so I’d be shocked if they made the same mistake as Memphis and let him walk for nothing. Malcolm Brogdon seems like the obvious target, but we’ll have to wait and see.

In this tale of two franchises, the Knicks and Grizzlies offer contrasting narratives about NBA rebuilds in the modern era. The Knicks, under Leon Rose, have meticulously crafted a sustainable blueprint for success. Their approach of ensuring a healthy competition for minutes by pairing rookies with productive veterans has fostered a culture of earned playing time and constant accountability. This strategy has not only helped develop the skills of their individual young talent, but led to increased success for the team as a whole. 

The Grizzlies, despite initial success, seem to have faltered. Their reliance on young, inexperienced talent seems short-sighted in the broader spectrum of team development. Their lack of significant signings and reluctance to make bold, transformative trades have seen them lag behind, especially in a season marred by the absence of Morant. As the Knicks stay the course, the Grizzlies find themselves at a crossroads.