Film review: Keys to the Finals
The Finals are upon us, and my sense is that many people are writing off the Miami Heat. I think this is a mistake. First, we shouldn’t forget that the Heat have already knocked out a legitimate contender in the Milwaukee Bucks. It’s easy to forget how good the Bucks were, because of how early they lost (and the manner that they lost in), but the Bucks were no joke. They also have — by far — the best defense that LA has seen in these playoffs. And the key to their offense — their movement shooting — is something that the Lakers’ traditional drop defense may struggle with. Let’s dig into that latter point.
The Lakers’ defense against movement shooting
The first thing that pops out on film is that the Lakers love to play with a drop big on the floor — usually either JaVale McGee or Dwight Howard. Combine this with Anthony Davis at the 4, and it’s no surprise that the Lakers were one of the best teams at defending the rim this season. There’s no reason to think they won’t present problems inside for Miami. Out on the perimeter is where things become a lot more interesting.
The biggest weakness of drop-and-trail coverage is its susceptibility to off-screen movement shooting. Let’s take a quick look at why this is. In drop-and-trail coverage, the point of attack defender trails the ball handler (or hand-off receiver) around the ball screen, and the big drops back towards the paint. Take a look at this clip from last week’s Strickland Test to see how this can result in open threes:
This defense puts an enormous amount of pressure on the point of attack defender. If they are unable to stay connected and push the ball handler off the 3-point line from behind, there is no one else there to stop the three. That’s exactly what played out in that clip: Kemba is unable to stay connected to Tyler Herro, and Herro has a wide open look at the hoop because Theis is too far back in drop to offer help.
The Nuggets did their best to take advantage of this against the Lakers, and Jamal Murray was able to generate a number of quality off-screen looks from three. Let’s look at the film:
Here the Nuggets use an old David Fizdale favorite, a stagger screen where the second screen is a double handoff (DHO):
There are two important things that happen in this play. First, take a look at Dwight Howard’s first step. When Murray comes around Jokić’s screen, he takes a quick hop back towards the hoop and out of position to help on a Murray 3-point attempt. This is a classic feature of drop coverage. Second, take a look at how Kentavious Caldwell-Pope is unable to stay connected to Murray when trailing him. Combine these two things together, and Murray has as wide open a look as any not-named-Rondo shooter is going to find in the conference finals.
One way the Lakers attempted to combat this was by putting a long, wriggly defender with the skill to get around screens on Murray — Alex Caruso. But even for a talented defender like him, staying connected to shifty movement shooters coming off multiple screens is a difficult challenge:
This time, the Lakers have a more mobile defender guarding the screener in Morris, but they still have him in drop coverage (notice his first step). Murray is again left with a fantastic look.
But the Lakers did have some success with this strategy. In this next play, Jokić sets a weak screen, and Caruso is able to force Murray off the 3-point line and into a mid-range jumper (which drop defense is designed to allow):
Another strategy the Lakers used was bringing their bigs up (almost) to the level of the screen. The problem they faced with this strategy was that Howard and McGee did not always have the foot speed to deal with Jamal Murray. In this next clip, Murray reads Howard coming up to the level of the screen and splits the double to get to the cup. And, since Howard came all the way out to the 3-point line, there was no rim protector back to offer help:
But, in general, the Lakers’ best strategy was to rely on Murray’s defender to make the difference, and to put their best defenders (Caruso and LeBron) on him when it mattered. In the end, their bigs were just too slow-footed to offer productive help on the perimeter:
This strategy can work out when you have a defender with Caruso’s skill at getting over screens or LeBron’s strength for getting through screens AND your opponent only has one deadly movement shooter.
But the Heat are not the Nuggets. Miami uses a lot of the same double drag and DHO actions as Denver, but, unlike Denver, they have the best movement shooting team in the playoffs. They have a battery of players who can effectively come off PnRs, handoffs, and off-ball screens and pop threes.
The Heat feasted on the Celtics in the ECF with Daniel Theis, Robert “Time Lord” Williams, and Knick great Enes Kanter in drop coverage — even with Boston’s tenacious and talented bevy of wing defenders. And, in my view, there’s little reason to believe that they won’t find similar luck against LA. Let’s look at the film:
Oh, hey! It’s that double drag DHO again. And look how open that shot is. I mean, this is Duncan Robinson shooting, so it doesn’t REALLY matter whether he’s open, running full speed, or 30 feet from the hoop, but in this case he was pretty dang open. The Celtics are in the same drop and trail coverage the Lakers love to use, and the Heat create an open look.
This was not a one-off for Robinson. His speed and shiftiness created massive problems for the defense over and over. I genuinely feel sorry for the Celtics on the next two clips (HA! not):
If the Heat’s movement shooting ended there, the Lakers might be able to get away with alternating Caruso and LeBron on Robinson and living with the results. The problem is that their movement shooting does not end there.
While Tyler Herro is not as deadly as Robinson, he brings an element of on-ball creation that Robinson does not. And against the Celtics’ soft drop, that resulted in a number of excellent looks:
Herro is solid off the ball too. Here’s our old friend again, the double drag DHO:
The Heat’s movement shooting doesn’t end with those two. While Goran Dragić does not have the quickness of the the other two, he still can hit pull-up threes off the dribble and DHO:
So what should the Lakers do? It’s not feasible for Caruso to guard three guys, and LeBron can’t carry the offensive load he’s required to carry while chasing Robinson or Herro around screens all game. One possibility is to go small. While the Rockets were a vastly different opponent (significantly less screening actions, and dramatically less motion), the Lakers sometimes went small against them to deal with their shooting threats, and they opted to go small in the closing minutes against the Nuggets as well. With Markieff Morris or Kyle Kuzma at the 4 and AD at the 5, it makes it easier for them to stretch their defense out to the perimeter where they can hedge, blitz, or switch screens, and this might just be what the Heat’s movement shooting forces the Lakers to do.
There are two major problems with this. First, it limits LA’s rebounding advantage. And second, this will undoubtedly affect their ability to defend the rim. I’m particularly worried about the latter. One thing that the Celtics struggled with against the Heat was defending the roll man (usually Bam) in PnRs. Because of Miami’s lethal shooters, the Celtics were reticent to send taggers to help on the roll (for an explanation of the tagger’s job, check out The Strickland Test!), and Bam Adebayo was able to eat plentifully as a result (check out this awesome video by Mo Dakhil for more).
If the Lakers play big, they’ll have a few key advantages over the Celtics against PnRs. Most obviously, AD et al. offers significantly more vertical rim protection than Daniel Theis. Second, because of AD and LeBron’s size and length (compare with Tatum and Smart’s length), helping off shooters should be a little bit more feasible. That length makes hitting shooters a little bit more challenging, and often makes the passes slower (you have to put a little more arc on the pass to get it over AD) and that allows the defense precious extra seconds to recover.
If the Lakers are forced to play small by Miami’s movement shooting and screening game, then some of that advantage evaporates. Still, even when playing small, the Lakers are much bigger than the diminutive Celtics.
Perhaps a better strategy for the Lakers is to use a lot of top-lock defense when Miami goes with their shooting-heavy lineups. Top-locking is an off-ball defensive strategy meant to prevent shooters from using pin down screens. Imagine you’re guarding Steph Curry off-ball. If you try to stay between him and the basket, he’s going to run you into screen after screen, and you’re going to have a terrible time preventing him from getting good looks from three.
What if, instead of staying between him and the basket, you got between him and half-court? This sounds crazy, right?! Surely you don’t want to just welcome backdoor cuts and layups! But against shooters as lethal as Curry, it is sometimes better to give up backdoor cuts if it means you can prevent open threes. And by standing between him and half-court, you make it pretty difficult for him to use screens that require him to run towards half-court. Here’s a collection of top-lock examples put together by The Basketball Dictionary.
If the Lakers top-lock both Herro and Robinson, this will put enormous pressure on their bigs, because there will be ample opportunity for both to backdoor cut. But this is a pressure that the Lakers should be able to handle if they play big — it’s the luxury that comes from playing two monstrous rim protectors together. There also will be opportunities for the Heat to use horizontal screening actions (ones that don’t move towards half-court), like flex screens and floppy screens.
Ultimately, NBA defense is always a game of trade-offs. More often than not the cost of limiting one type of shot is allowing another. With this in mind, if I’m the Lakers, my defensive strategy is:
Try to play big.
Top-lock Herro and Robinson, doing everything possible to prevent them from using pin-downs and DHOs
Play drop against Dragić—live with him shooting pull-up threes.
If forced to play small, continue to top-lock. But bring bigs (AD, Morris, LeBron) up above the level of the screen against shooters and switch late in the shot-clock (especially against Robinson — no threat of self-creation. Only threat from switching is that the big can’t stay with him when he cuts/re-locates. If he uses another screen, you can switch again).
